



OWASP
AppSec EU
Belfast

8th to 12th
of May
2017

Waterfront
Conference
Center

Printer Security

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<http://www.nds.rub.de/>

Why printers?



Evolution




1987



2017

Yet another T in the IoT?



Contributions


- Systematization of printer attacks
- Evaluation of 20 printer models
- PRinter Exploitation Toolkit (PRET)
- Novel attacks beyond printers
- New research directions

Overview




- 1. Background**
- 2. Attacks**
- 3. Evaluation**
- 4. PRET**
- 5. Beyond printers**
- 6. Countermeasures**

How to print?



1. Printing channel (USB, network, ...)
2. Printer language (PCL, PostScript, ...)

What to attack?



PJL

- Printer Job Language
- Manages settings like output tray or paper size

```
@PJL SET PAPER=A4
```


```
@PJL SET COPIES=10
```

```
@PJL ENTER LANGUAGE=POSTSCRIPT
```

- NOT limited to the current print job

PostScript

- Invented by Adobe (1982 – 1984)
- Heavily used on laser printers
- Turing complete language



Overview

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Attacker model: Physical access

- Is your copy room **always** locked?




Attacker model: Network access


- Who would connect a printer to the Internet?



Attacker model: Network access



Attacker model: Web attacker



Four classes of attacks

- Denial of service
- Protection bypass
- Print job manipulation
- Information disclosure

Denial of service

- Postscript infinite loop

```
{ } loop
```


Protection bypass

- Reset to factory defaults
- Can be done with a print job (HP)

```
@PJL DMCMD ASCIIHEX=  
"040006020501010301040106"
```

Print job manipulation


- Redefinition of Postscript *showpage* operator




Information disclosure

- Access to memory
- Access to file system
- Capture print jobs
 - Save on file system or in memory


Attacker model: Web attacker



Same-origin policy



CORS spoofing



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Obtaining printers

- How would you proceed?

**Our approach: Contacted university
system administrators**

Printers. Lots of printers



Evaluation results

Attack Categories		Denial of Service				Protection Bypass			Print Job Manipulation		Information Disclosure						# Printer Vulnerabilities
Attacks		infinite loop	showpage redefinition	offline mode	physical damage	restoring factory defaults			content overlay	content replacement	memory access	file system access	print job capture	credential disclosure			
Printers \ Printer Languages		PS	PS	PJL	PJL	SNMP	PML	PS	PS		PJL	PS	PJL	PS	PS	PJL	
1	HP LaserJet 1200	1	1						1	1				1	1*	1	7
2	HP LaserJet 4200N	1	1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1	1	1*	1	12
3	HP LaserJet 4250N	1	1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1	1	1*	1	12
4	HP LaserJet P2015dn	1	1			1	1	1*	1	1				1	1*	1	10
5	HP LaserJet M2727nfs	1*	1		1	1		1*	1	1				1	1*	1	10
6	HP LaserJet 3392 AiO	1	1			1	1	1*	1	1				1	1*	1	10
7	HP Color LaserJet CP1515n	1	1			1	1	1*	1	1				1	1*	1	10
8	Brother MFC-9120CN	1			1*			1*			1	1*			1	1	7
9	Brother DCP-9045CDN	1			1*			1*			1	1*			1	1	7
10	Lexmark X264dn	1	1	1		1			1	1		1*		1	1*	n/a	9
11	Lexmark E360dn	1	1	1	1*	1			1	1		1*		1	1*	n/a	10
12	Lexmark C736dn	1	1	1	1*	1			1	1		1*		1	1*	n/a	10
13	Dell 5130cdn	1	?		1				?	?		1*		1	1*	n/a	5
14	Dell 1720n	1	1	1	1	1		1*	1	1		1*		1	1*	n/a	11
15	Dell 3110cn	1	1					1*	1	1			1*			n/a	6
16	Kyocera FS-C5200DN	1	1	1		1			1	1		1*			n/a	1	8
17	Samsung CLX-3305W	1	?						?	?						n/a	1
18	Samsung MultiPress 6345N	1	?						?	?						n/a	1
19	Konica bizhub 20p	1		1	1*						1	1*			1	1	7
20	OKI MC342dn	1	1						1	1		1*	1*	1	1*	n/a	8
# Vulnerable Printers		20	14	8	8	11	5	8	14	14	3	12	4	13	16	11	

Legend:


1	device vulnerable
1*	vulnerability is limited
	not vulnerable/PostScript feedback not available

?	not tested – physically broken printing functionality
n/a	no support for PostScript or PJL password protection

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PRinter Exploitation Toolkit (PRET)



PRET commands

Command	PS	PJL	Description
<code>ls</code>	✓	✓	List contents of remote directory.
<code>get</code>	✓	✓	Receive file: <code>get <file></code>
<code>put</code>	✓	✓	Send file: <code>put <local file></code>
<code>append</code>	✓	✓	Append to file: <code>append <file> <str></code>
<code>delete</code>	✓	✓	Delete remote file: <code>delete <file></code>
<code>rename</code>	✓		Rename remote file: <code>rename <old> <new></code>
<code>find</code>	✓	✓	Recursively list directory contents.
<code>mirror</code>	✓	✓	Mirror remote file system to local dir.
<code>touch</code>	✓	✓	Update file timestamps: <code>touch <file></code>
<code>mkdir</code>	✓	✓	Create remote directory: <code>mkdir <path></code>
<code>cd</code>	✓	✓	Change remote working directory.
<code>pwd</code>	✓	✓	Show working directory on device.
<code>chvol</code>	✓	✓	Change remote volume: <code>chvol <volume></code>
<code>format</code>	✓	✓	Initialize printer's file system.
<code>fuzz</code>	✓	✓	File system fuzzing: <code>fuzz <category></code>
<code>df</code>	✓	✓	Show volume information.
<code>free</code>	✓	✓	Show available memory.

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Google Cloud Print

Target: Google


\$ 3133.7



Converting PostScript = interpreting PostScript

PostScript in the web?

- PS conversion websites
- Image conversion sites
- Thumbnail preview



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


Countermeasures



Do not connect printers to the Internet

“Hacker Stackoverflowin made 160,000 printers spew out ASCII art around the world” -- theregister.co.uk



Countermeasures

- ***Employees:*** always lock the copy room
- ***Administrators:*** sandbox printers in a VLAN accessible only via print server
- ***Printer vendors:*** undo insecure design decisions (PostScript, proprietary PPL)
- ***Browser vendors:*** block port 9100

Conclusions and future work

- Systematic analysis of network printers and printing standards
- Insecurity of Postscript and PDL
- Attacks applied to different areas
- TODO:
 - Firmware Updates, Fax, 3D printing

Thanks for your attention...

PRET („Printer Exploitation Toolkit“)

- <https://github.com/RUB-NDS/PRET>

Hacking Printers Wiki

- <http://hacking-printers.net/>

Questions?

