Security In The Land of Microservices

Jack Mannino
Who Am I?

• Jack Mannino
  – CEO @ nVisium
  – Banned from computers by his co-workers
  – Does most of his development in Scala
  – Has a love/hate relationship with microservices
    • From experience building them
What’s This All About?

• Microservice pattern and what’s unique
• Asset and Data Inventory
• Authentication
• Access Control and Identity Management
• Securely Sharing Secrets
• RASP, Top 10 lists
What Are Microservices?

The term "Microservice Architecture" has sprung up over the last few years to describe a particular way of designing software applications as suites of independently deployable services. While there is no precise definition of this architectural style, there are certain common characteristics around organization around business capability, automated deployment, intelligence in the endpoints, and decentralized control of languages and data. - Martin Fowler
Properties of Microservices

✓ Independently deployable services
✓ Decentralized management and governance
✓ Structured around business capabilities
✓ Resilient to failures and contagion between services
✓ “Smart endpoints, dumb pipes”
What Are Microservices?

Microservices simplify everything

Wrong
SOA/ESB For Hipsters

Struts!

Monolithic

Microservices
One External View, Many Services

Order History
Reviews
Product Information
Recommendations
Inventory
Shipping
A Simple Architecture

- **API Gateway**
  - Linking to:
    - **Mobile**
    - **Single-page App**
    - **“Smart” Fridge**

- **Micro-Services**
  - **Accounts**
  - **Order History**
  - **Billing**
  - **Shopping Cart**

- **Kafka**
  - **accounts**
  - **billing**
  - **orders**
  - **shipping**

- **MySQL**
  - Accounts: Billing

- **Cassandra**
  - Order History

- **Redis**
  - Shopping Cart
  - In-Memory cache of cart and suggestions
Step #1 – Secure Your APIs

• Your APIs are the gateway into the microservice architecture

• Anyone selling you Cross Site Microservice Injection prevention, is lying

• Issues like SQL Injection is still SQL Injection, but we lose source/sink visibility
Data and Asset Inventory
Once upon a time, we released 3-4 times a year.

CI/CD, container orchestration, and Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) has changed that.
When Life Was Easy

Client (Web Browser) → Web Application + Apache Tomcat → Database
• Code is now infrastructure
• Developer laptops often hold the keys to the kingdom
• Fairly new-ish territory for many security teams
  – Immature organization practices = massive business disruption
Infrastructure-As-Code

```json
{
  "AWSTemplateFormatVersion": "2010-09-09",
  "Description": "DC/OS AWS CloudFormation Template",
  "Metadata": {
    "DcosImageCommit": "unset",
    "TemplateGenerationDate": "unset"
  },

  "Parameters": {
    "KeyName": {
      "Description": "Required: Specify your AWS EC2 Key Pair.",
      "Type": "AWS::EC2::KeyPair::KeyName"
    },
    "AdminLocation": {
      "Description": "Optional: Specify the IP range to whitelist for access to the admin zone. Must be a valid CIDR.",
      "Type": "String",
      "MinLength": "9",
      "MaxLength": "18",
      "Default": "0.0.0.0/0",
      "AllowedPattern": "([0-9]{1,3}\.|[0-1]{0,1}[0-9]{1,2}){1,3}\/[0-1]{1,2}\$/",
      "ConstraintDescription": "must be a valid CIDR."
    },
    "SlaveInstanceCount": {
      "Description": "Required: Specify the number of private agent nodes or accept the default.",
      "Type": "Number",
      "Default": "{{ num_private_slaves }}"
    },
    "PublicSlaveInstanceCount": {
      "Description": "Required: Specify the number of public agent nodes or accept the default.",
      "Type": "Number",
      "Default": "{{ num_public_slaves }}"
  },

  provider "aws" {
    region = "${var.region}"
  }

  module "vpc" {
    source = "./vpc"
    key_name = "${var.key_name}"
    ip_range = "${var.ip_range}"
  }

  module "elb" {
    source = "./elb"
    public-subnet-az-1a = "${module.vpc.public-subnet-az-1a}"
    public-subnet-az-1b = "${module.vpc.public-subnet-az-1b}"
    elb_http_inbound_sg_id = "${module.vpc.elb_http_inbound_sg_id}"}

  module "asg" {
    source = "./asg"
    public-subnet-az-1a = "${module.vpc.public-subnet-az-1a}"
    public-subnet-az-1b = "${module.vpc.public-subnet-az-1b}"
    dev-http-lc-id = "${module.lc.dev-http-lc-id}"
    dev-http-lc-name = "${module.lc.dev-http-lc-name}"
    dev-web-elb-name = "${module.elb.dev_web_elb_name}"
  }

  module "lc" {
    source = "./lc"
    ec2_http_inbound_sg_id = "${module.vpc.ec2_http_inbound_sg_id}"
    key_name = "${var.key_name}"
  }
```
Infrastructure-As-Code

• Now, your architecture might be in a GitHub repo
• Important to restrict who can commit to master
• Important to review code merges (pull requests, etc)
• Great for auditability and inventory management, if done correctly
Containers and Orchestration

- Kubernetes
- DC/OS
- Docker
- OpenShift
Serverless Functions

- Tools like AWS Lambda, Azure Cloud Functions
- Stateless and short-lived
- Finish your work in 5 minutes or “die”
- Monorepos vs. distributed repositories
- Security tools with performance hit?
  – *Enjoy getting laughed at*
Where’s My Data? Clean Up Your Toys

- Intentional persistence
- Message queues and commit logs
- Code repositories
- Developer laptops
- Zeppelin notebooks
- Everywhere?
Authentication
API Gateway Pattern

- API Gateway is the most prolific Microservice authentication pattern
- Similar to the Façade pattern
- Encapsulates internal architecture
- Abstracts your services from authentication
- Many implementations
  - AWS API Gateway
  - Azure API Gateway
  - Mashape Kong
API Gateway + Lambda = Frontend + Backend!
At my day job, we use AWS API Gateway + Cognito to handle the heavy lifting

- Cognito handles authenticating with credentials, MFA, etc.
API Gateway Pattern

• Each request is signed, which provides an additional layer of authentication
  – Integrate Lambda functions for pre/post processing hooks
  – Bonus: good architecture = breaks CSRF if done correctly

• Can consume your Swagger files
Once You Get Past The Gateway

• The gateway can share data with downstream services
• Lambda function post-processing
• Standard + Custom attributes
  – Username, email
  – Custom attributes for your app
Access Control and Identity Management
• So we’ve decentralized things, right?
• API Gateway + JWT can help
• Patterns like CQRS can architecturally limit damage and exposure across interfaces
• Love it or hate it, JWT allows us to pass identity and claims across services
• We still need to consider the business rules of each service, but we have a starting point
JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

Diagram:
- Client sends a request with a bearer token to the API Gateway.
- The API Gateway passes the request to the Lambda Auth function, which extracts the context and token.
- The function then determines the principal and policy.
- Policy is evaluated by the API Gateway.
- If allowed, the request proceeds to the AWS Lambda functions.
- If denied, a 403 status code is returned.
- Policy is cached for future requests.

Endpoints:
- Any other publicly accessible endpoint.
Command Query Responsibility Segregation (CQRS)

- Command and query interfaces are separated
- Independent read and write models
- Possibly, independent data stores for read and write
- We have a lot more granular control over which services and users we authorize around capabilities
Command Query Responsibility Segregation (CQRS)

Presentation

- Validation
- Commands
- Domain logic
- Data persistence

Write data store → Read data store

Queries (generate DTOs)
What About Between Services?

- Think of scenarios like messaging between services
  - Identify trusted publishers and subscribers
  - Determine which services should consume your data, and limit scope
  - Apply authentication and topic-level authorization

Producer:

```bash
kafka-console-producer.sh --broker-list localhost:9092 --topic creditcard-stuff
This is a credit card # 1234567890123456
This is a credit card # 1234567890111111
```

Consumer:

```bash
kafka-console-consumer.sh --bootstrap-server localhost:9092 --topic creditcard-stuff --from-beginning
```
Securely Sharing Secrets
Keeping Secrets

• You don’t want to pass credentials around in plain text (no-brainer, right?)
• There are options, but they vary with mileage
Bad Ideas

👍 Hardcoding credentials in your code
👍 Hardcoding credentials in your Dockerfile
👍 Using environment variables to pass secrets
Hardcoded Secrets

```bash
# CentOS 7 + ssh + ttyjs (in Supervisord)
FROM centos:centos7
RUN \
    yum update -y && \
    yum install -y epel-release && \
    yum install -y net-tools python-setuptools hostname inotify-tools yum-utils coreutils pwiem && \
    yum clean all

# Install supervisord
RUN easy_install supervisord

# Prepare the container for our use with a Volume for logs and apps (/data)
# Prepare the container for our use with a directory to run custom bootstrap procedure
RUN mkdir -p /config/init && \
    mkdir -p /data

# Environment variable provision to accept root-password while creating container
ENV ROOT_PASS password

# Create /etc/supervisord.conf
RUN echo "[supervisord]" > /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "pidfile = /run/supervisord.pid" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "# It seems that it's not possible to switch this log to NONE (it creates NONE logfile)" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "logfile = /data/logs/supervisord.log" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "# Set loglevel=debug, only then all logs from child services are printed out" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "# to container logs (and thus available via the command below - " >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "docker logs [container]" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "#loglevel = debug" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo """ >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "# These two (unix_http_server, rpcinterface) are needed for supervisorctl to work" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "[inet_http_server]" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "port = :9111" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "username = sv" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
    echo "password = password" >> /etc/supervisord.conf && \
```

OWASP AppSec Belfast
docker run --it --env "DBUSER=dbuser" --env "DBPASSWD=dbpasswd" mydbimage

⚠️ Every process in your container can read these variables

⚠️ You risk leaking secrets via dashboards, logs and history
A Perfect Solution?

• Not quite, but Docker leads the pack 🌟
• Kubernetes, DC/OS, OpenShift all have options too
Passing Secrets To A Kubernetes Pod

Create Files Use a Secret

$ echo -n "administrator" > ./username.txt
$ echo -n "0XDEADB33F" > ./password.txt

Create Secrets

$ kubectl create secret generic db-user-pw
--from-file=./username.txt
--from-file=./password.txt
secret "db-user-pw" created

Use A Secret

```
"apiVersion": "v1",
"kind": "Pod",
"metadata": {
  "name": "jackpod",
  "namespace": "jack"
},
"spec": {
  "containers": [
    {
      "name": "cart-cache",
      "image": "redis",
      "volumeMounts": [
        {
          "name": "redis-secrets",
          "mountPath": "/etc/redis-secrets",
          "readOnly": true
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "volumes": [
    {
      "name": "foo",
      "secret": {
        "secretName": "mysecret"
      }
    }
  ]
}
```
But Even The Good Solutions....

• By default, Kubernetes stores your credentials in plain text on the server in etcd
  – etcd is a distributed key-value store
  – Stores and replicates cluster state
• However, this is a lot better than nothing
• Proposal to encrypt secrets at-rest
  – https://github.com/kubernetes/community/pull/454
Managing Secrets on OpenShift – Vault Integration

MAY 9, 2017 BY RAFFAELE SPAZZOLI

Introduction

Credentials are environment dependent configurations that need to be kept secret and should be read only by subjects with a need-to-know.

A previous blog post talked about how to manage environment dependent configuration when building delivery pipelines – these approaches are not adequate for secrets because they don't guarantee confidentiality.

OpenShift offers secrets as a way to inject credentials. Secrets behave as encoded-64 configmaps. From a security perspective, they have the following limitations (as of release 3.5):

1. They are not encrypted at rest.
2. By default, cluster admins can see all the secrets of all the tenants.
3. When in use (i.e. mounted as tempfs in the node that runs the pod that is using them), they can be seen by a node administrator.
4. When in use, they can be seen by anyone who has the ability to remote shell into the container.
Summary

• Increased complexity, with security opportunities
• Things are more likely to spin out of control vs. monolithic apps if you don’t get a handle on them early
• It’s important to make security fit into microservices, not the other way around
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