




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Securing the CI

Irene Michlin, Principal Security Consultant



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People, process, and technology


Step 1: make sure your CI does not harm your security

Step 2: only then it can be used to improve your security

This is not “tools” talk




Basic CI cycle



Isolate your environment

- Phishing link in email => keylogger installed => source code gone (or backdoor deployed)
- Experimenting with development network => accounting department affected before EOY
- Extra challenges: remote work or BYOD





Version control server

- It has one job only – remove or disable everything else
- No shared or generic accounts
- Matching business process to close accounts




Integration build server

- Who is responsible for keeping it up to date?
- Where do external components come from?
- Check vendor advice on compiler and linker options

Feedback mechanism

- IoT electronic toys are notoriously insecure
- Custom integration scripts - are you cutting corners?

4. Setup the Jenkins [notification plugin](#). Define a `UDP` endpoint on port `22222` pointing to the system hosting . *Tip: Make sure your firewall is not blocking UDP on this port.*

```
#  
# If you're Jenkins server is secured by HTTP basic auth, sent the  
# username and password here. Else leave this blank.  
HTTPAUTH_USER      = ""  
HTTPAUTH_PASS      = ""
```




Do no harm

- Do not acquire CI components « by accident »
- Not everything is secure out of the box
- Dormant account today is an attacker-controlled account tomorrow

From dormant to active




CI Maturity model



Code reviews

- No change too small
- Leave trivial checks to tools
- Not a separate task, but in DoI
- Reject & rework is part of “no



Dev &
QA

Unit Test
Code Coverage

Metrics on tech
debt &
compliance
Mock-ups &
proxies

Code reviews
Automated
functional tests

Test Data
Test in target

Automated
acceptance test

Root-cause Analysis

- What happens to externally reported issues?
- The first security feedback to introduce
- What was missing in our CI process? => Improve

Security

RCA after bugs in
the field reported
Tracking security
issues in bug DB

Coding standards
CI build standard
options
Banned functions/
APIs
Security features
tested

Dynamic analysis on
commit
Security-driven test
cases
Signed binaries

Incremental threat
modelling and
attack surface
review
Fuzzing
Static analysis

3rd party code
inventory
Customised tools
Risk-based testing
Bug bounty program

Chain of custody

- Can you trust your release notes?
- Has every “unit of work” in the release gone through all the checks?
- Was it modified since “time of check”?

SCM

Early branching
Feature
branches
Rare merges

Late branching
Release branches
Merges are
common

Pre-tested
commits
Integration
branch is pristine

Branch by
abstraction
Feature toggle

Release notes &
traceability
analysis auto-
generated



“On commit” is great

- Automated coding standards checks
- Code complexity / code duplication
- Banned functions / APIs
- Dynamic analysis
- Static analysis
- Fuzzing
- <https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/securing-the-continuous-integration-process/>



Points of contact

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