

Incremental Threat Modelling

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Never try to boil an ocean





- Coming from software development and architecture
 - 20 years as software engineer, architect, technical lead
- Variety of consulting and testing work
 - From corporations to start-ups
- Favourite engagement type threat modelling





- STRIDE quick recap
- Introducing our example
- Incremental modelling walk-through
- Sting in the tail
- Conclusions
- Q&A

Threat modelling - reminder

- Decompose architecture using DFDs
- Search for threats using STRIDE
- Rank or quantify out of scope for today

Data Flow Diagrams



 People Logical Other Service RPC Database Process File Dundary Queue/Stack Network Queue/Stack Network 	External Entity	Process	Data Flow	Data Store	Trust Boundary
Process in File I/O boundary memory	 People Other systems 	 Logical component Service Process in memory 	 RPC Network traffic File I/O 	DatabaseFileQueue/Stack	 Process boundary Network boundary







Threat	Property	Definition
Spoofing	Authentication	Impersonating something or someone else
Tampering	Integrity	Modifying data or code
Repudiation	Non-repudiation	Claiming to have not performed an action
Information Disclosure	Confidentiality	Exposing information to non-authorised party
Denial of Service	Availability	Deny or degrade service
Elevation of Privilege	Authorization	Gain capabilities without proper authorisation

Introducing our example



- Explain the existing architecture and the feature we are planning to add
- Pretend that threat model for the existing part does not exist
- Model new feature

A very simple architecture



OWASP

AppSec EU

Now pretend to forget it





We are going to use a 3rd party reporting and analytics technology. They are going to host Data Warehouse (DWH) and reporting server on their infrastructure.

They will give us licences to use their web-based Analytics App, which can query the reporting server. The only thing we need to build in-house is an aggregator process,

which will get data from our database, aggregate it and upload it to the DWH on a regular basis (they provide API for automated upload).













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Relevant Threats

Spoofing

• Can attacker upload data on our behalf? How we authenticate the destination before uploading?

Tampering and Information Disclosure

• Can attacker sniff the data or tamper with it?

Repudiation

 Can DWH claim we didn't send the data? Or sent above the quota?

Denial of service

• Is there availability SLA for uploads?

Privacy

- Can our aggregation be reverse engineered?
- Do we need to notify the users that 3rd party is involved?





User



OWASP

AppSec EU Belfast

How to make them go away



- We are not making it worse
- Can anonymous user bypass access controls and modify something?
 - We are not making it worse
- Is our datacentre infrastructure secure?
 - We are not making it worse (careful here!)
- Can analytics user abuse licencing?
 - Not our problem, 3rd party problem





Not our problem

• If the team's task is not just to implement with a chosen provider, but to evaluate several providers.

We are not making it worse

• If you come across something so catastrophic in the "Legacy blob", that it's an immediately obvious critical flaw.

What if implementation deviates from design?

• Aggregator is implemented as two processes: one to read and aggregate the data, the other for actual upload

 Time pressure and we MUST have analytics in the release. Let's create a user for this 3rd party so they pull data directly from our DB.

Looks familiar?





Untested (ball of mud) legacy code



Introducing tests for new and modified code



Eventually getting (almost) fully tested code

This does not work in security!

- NTVDM bug found in 2010, introduced in 1993
- Shellshock found in 2014, introduced in 1989
- Heartbleed found in 2014, introduced in 2011
- POODLE found in 2014, existed since 1996
- JASBUG found in 2015, introduced in 2000
- DROWN, Badlock, gotofail, etc.

Eventually need the whole picture

- What we don't know can harm us
- The system is greater than the sum of its parts

Eventually is better than upfront

- People have developed the necessary skills
- Many subsystems will be already analysed
- Easier to achieve management buy-in





- Incremental threat modelling can fit any time-box, without disturbing the regular development cadence.
- You can build a model of the whole system in parallel, starting from day 1, or waiting for several cycles, whatever suits your situation.
- As a shortcut, you can bring external resources to help with the initial model.
- But for the best results in agile environment you have to involve the whole team.











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