



Node.js

Could a few lines of code F@#k it all up?

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CHECKMARX





Could a few lines of code F@#k it all up?

Short answer: YES!

Longer answer: **Definitely YES!**



What if the vulnerable line is this?

var x = require('nodepackage');



Open Source

- 65%-90% of commercial application make use of Open Source Software
- Open Source is great but....
- Node.js is a leading framework
- Some issues with node's repository are concerning from the security point of view



The left-pad fiasco (March 2016)

Azer Koçulu

A fairly anonymous developer that decided to "Liberate" his Node.js packages following a disagreement with npm staff

Among his modules was a little module named *left-pad*

```
module.exports = leftpad;
function leftpad (str, len, ch) {
   str = String(str);
   var i = -1;
   if (!ch && ch !== 0) ch = ' ';
   len = len - str.length;
   while (++i < len) {
     str = ch + str;
   }
   return str;
}</pre>
```

The left-pad fiasco





silkentrance commented on Mar 22

When building projects on travis, or when searching for left-pad on npmjs.com, both will report that the package cannot be found.

Here is an excerpt from the travis build log

```
npm ERR! Linux 3.13.0-40-generic
npm ERR! argv "/home/travis/.nvm/versions/node/v4.2.2/bin/node" "/home/travis/.nvm/versions/node/v4
npm ERR! node v4.2.2
npm ERR! npm v2.14.7
```

npm ERR! 404 Registry returned 404 for GET on https://registry.npmjs.org/left-pad

npm ERR! 404 'left-pad' is not in the npm registry.
npm ERR! 404 You should bug the author to publish it (or use the name yourself!)

npm ERR! 404 'left-pad' is not in the npm registry.

npm ERR! 404 You should bug the author to publish it (or use the name yourself!)

```
npm ERR! Please include the following file with any support request:

npm ERR! /home/travis/build/coldrye-es/pingo/npm-debug.log

make: *** [deps] Error 1
```

The left-pad fiasco



Left-pad was used by ~40 npm modules including React and Babel (used by FaceBook, AirBnB and others)

- First of all Azer is no longer anonymous.
- He actually triggered an important discussion within the community
- Should an author be able to un-publish his work without a process?
- What happens to the available module names?





The npm platform


Node.js Package Manager

- Open source package manager
- "Find, share, and reuse packages of code from hundreds of thousands of developers"
- Around 450K modules available




npm encourages the use of semver - semantic versioning.

Upgrade





- npm encourages the use of semver semantic versioning.
 - Dependencies are not locked to a certain version by default.
 - For any package, the author can push a new version at any time.





- npm utilizes **persistent authentication** to the npm server.
 - Users are not logged out until they voluntarily do so.






- Centralized registry NPM utilizes a centralized registry
 - Typing npm publish ships your code to this registry server, where it can be installed by anyone.
 - Any user who is currently logged in and types npm install may allow any module to execute arbitrary publish commands









4 Dependencies?

Let's check




So simple - npm/mstall <module name>

```
C:\data\DB\SQLInjectionMongoDBGet>
C:\data\DB\SQLInjectionMongoDBGet>
```

Lets take an example npm



4 Dependencies?







Iodash

Iodash



45K Dependents!




30,683,087

downloads last

month!







Let's take a look at some potential scenarios



Ways to cause damage

- Create a useful module
 - Some good old marketing
 - Update it after it gets adoption
- Create module with similar name (Typo attacks)
- Taking over control of a legit account
 Packages are identified by names (No unique identifier/key)
- Create a self replicating worm



npm hydra worm disclosure

Author: Sam Saccone

tl;dr

It is possible for a single malicious npm package to spread itself across most of the npm ecosystem very quickly. This package could enable delivery of a potentially targeted, malicious payload to corporate entities.

Full report by Sam Saccone: https://www.kb.cert.org/CERT_WEB/services/vul-

notes.nsf/6eacfaeab94596f5852569290066a50b/018dbb99def6980185257f820013f175/\$FILE/npmwormdisclosure.pdf



Creating a self replicating NPM worm (Lifecycle Scripts)



- Socially engineer an npm module owner to npm install an infected module
- Using installation scripts, the worm creates a new npm module



npm install Hydra_A


```
"scripts": {
    "start": "node create malicious_npm_module",
    "predeploy": "echo im about to deploy",
    "postdeploy": "echo ive deployed",
    "prepublish": "coffee --bare --compile --output
lib/foo src/foo/*.coffee"
```



Creating a self replicating NPM worm (Persistent Authentication)




- Worm sets lifecycle hook on the new module to execute the worm on install
- Worm publishes the new module to the user's npm account





Creating a self replicating NPM worm (Semantic Versioning)



- Worm traverse through all user's npm modules (publish permissions) and adds the new malicious module as a dependency in their package.json.
- Worm publishes new versions to each of the modules with a version bump at the patch level semver – masked as "hotfix"

```
John
```

```
"dependencies": {
    "primus": "*",
    "async": "~0.8.0",
    "express": "4.2.x",
    "malicious_npm_module": "
```



From Malicious to Careless



What is wrong with this picture?

```
return function middleware (req, res, next) {
    // Strip any null bytes from the url
    while(req.url.indexOf('%00') !== -1) {
        req.url = req.url.replace(/\%00/g, '');
    }
```

What we did



- Scan Node.js packages looking for vulnerabilties
 - Top 50 popular packages
 - Top 50 dependent-upon packages
 - Other popular packages
- Analyze results
- Responsible Disclosure
 - Contact dev
 - Wait for patch
 - Publish

npm top 50



Packages people 'npm install' a lot



browserify

browser-side require() the nod... 13.0.1 published 4 months ago by jmm



grunt-cli

The grunt command line interf...
1.2.0 published 5 months ago by vladikoff



bower

The browser package manager 1.7.9 published 5 months ago by sheerun



gulp

The streaming build system 3.9.1 published 7 months ago by phated



grunt

The JavaScript Task Runner 1.0.1 published 5 months ago by shama



express

Fast, unopinionated, minimali...
4.14.0 published 3 months ago by
dougwilson



npm

a package manager for JavaSc... 3.9.6 published 3 months ago by zkat



cordova

Cordova command line interfa... 6.2.0 published 4 months ago by stevegill



forever

A simple CLI tool for ensuring ... 0.15.2 published 4 months ago by indexzero

https://www.npmjs.com/

Most depended-upon packages

lodash

Lodash modular utilities. 4.15.0 published 4 weeks ago by jdalton

g request

Simplified HTTP request client. 2.74.0 published 2 months ago by simov

async

Higher-order functions and common patt... 2.0.1 published 2 months ago by megawac

underscore

JavaScript's functional programming help...

1.8.3 published a year ago by jashkenas

express

Fast, unopinionated, minimalist web fra... 4.14.0 published 3 months ago by dougwilson

commander

the complete solution for node.js comm... 2.9.0 published 11 months ago by zhiyelee

bluebird

Full featured Promises/A+ implementatio... 3.4.6 published a week ago by esailija

chalk

Terminal string styling done right. Much ... 1.1.3 published 5 months ago by qix

debug

small debugging utility
2.2.0 published a year ago by tootallnate

https://www.npmjs.com/

6/23/2016

6/23/2016

6/23/2016

6/23/2016

6/23/2016

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inherits-master

isarray-master

lodash-master

private-master

object-keys-master



47

25

128337

419

198

Scan for sec	urityussues	March March 19	Donas
PROJECT NAME	LAST SCAN DATE	TEAM	LOC
acorn-master	6/22/2016	CxServer\SP\Company\npm project	97564
ansi-regex-master	6/22/2016	CxServer\SP\Company\npm project	414
esprima-master	6/22/2016	CxServer\SP\Company\npm project	75907

CxServer\SP\Company\npm project

CxServer\SP\Company\npm project

CxServer\SP\Company\npm project

CxServer\SP\Company\npm project

CxServer\SP\Company\npm project



```
return function middleware (reg, res, next) {
49
      // Strip any null bytes from the url
      while (reg.url.indexOf('%00') !== -1)
         reg.url = reg.url.replace(/\%00/g, '');
      // Figure out the path for the file from the given url
      var parsed = url.parse(reg.url);
      try
        decodeURIComponent(reg.url); // check validity of url
         var pathname = decodePathname(parsed.pathname);
      catch (err) {
         return status[400] (res, next, { error: err });
      var file = path.normalize(
             path.join(root,
               path.relative(
                 path.join('/', baseDir),
                 pathname
```


47

50

63

65

What is wrong with this picture?





What is wrong with this picture?

```
return function middleware (req, res, next) {
    // Strip any null bytes from the url
    while(req.url.indexOf('%00') !== -1) {
        req.url = req.url.replace(/\%00/g, '');
    }
```



```
return function middleware (req, res, next) {
    // Strip any null bytes from the url
    while(req.url.indexOf('%00') !== -1) {
       req.url = req.url.replace(/\%00/g, '');
    }

node-ecstatic
```

- ~300K downloads a month
- ~370 other npm packages are dependent on ecstatic



Developer Response



PoC:

- 22Kb payload 1 sec lag
- 35Kb payload 3 sec lag
- 86Kb payload server crashed

http://www.checkmarx.com/%00%00%00% 00%00%00 (...)



Developer Response

```
return function middleware (req, res, next) {
  // Strip any null bytes from the url
  // This was at one point necessary because of an old bug in url.parse
    See: https://github.com/jfhbrook/node-ecstatic/issues/16#issuecomment-3039914
  // See: https://github.com/jfhbrook/node-ecstatic/commit/43f7e72a31524f88f47e367c3cc3af710e67c9f4
    But this opens up a regex dos attack vector! D:
  // Based on some research (ie asking #node-dev if this is still an issue),
  // it's *probably* not an issue. :)
 while (req.url.indexOf('\$00') !== -1) {
    req.url = req.url.replace(/\%00/g, '');
  * /
```





Other Scan Results

Command Injection

- Variable from user input was used as an argument for an OS command.
- Dev response:

"The flaw exists because the original author used it...

A possible solution is to delete the vulnerable file".



Other Scan Results

- Command Injection
- Stored XSS
- Denial of Service by Loop
- Denial of Service by Regex (ReDoS)
- CSV Injection
- Insecure Randomness
- Open Redirect



So how do we protect ourselves?

Be a Safe User!



- Inspect the code http://registry.npmjs.org/MODULENAME/ /MODULENAME-VERSION.tgz
- Check if there are any hooks: *npm show \$module scripts*
- Don't allow scripts to execute automatically: npm install –ignorescripts
- Use *npm shrinkwrap* to lock down your own dependencies
- Sometimes it's better to write your own functions!
- Analyze your code but your code includes your dependencies!
- Log out!



Be a Safe Corporate!

- Run a local NPM repo
- Prevent installing from main registry





Thank You.

Erez Yalon Head of AppSec Research



